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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In this appeal, Katie Jo Meyer challenges the district court’s finding that she willfully
violated her probation. She claims the district court applied an impermissibly low evidentiary
standard – proof by “substantial competent evidence” – to find that she willfully violated her
probation. The district court reinstated Ms. Meyer’s probation, and accordingly, her appeal does
not seek reinstatement as relief. Rather, her appeal seeks to vacate the district court’s finding
that she willfully violated probation, and its order revoking probation, due to the adverse
collateral consequences of that finding and order.
This Reply Brief is necessary to respond to the State’s arguments, show the “substantial
competent evidence” standard is not an appropriate standard of proof, and demonstrate that
neither the mootness doctrine nor the fundamental error doctrine apply to bar Ms. Meyer’s
appeal.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Meyer’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it applied an impermissibly low evidentiary
standard – requiring less than a preponderance of the evidence – to find Ms. Meyer violated
her probation?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Applied An Impermissibly Low Evidentiary
Standard – Requiring Less Than A Preponderance Of The Evidence – To Find Ms. Meyer
Violated Her Probation
A.

This Appeal Presents A Justiciable Claim Notwithstanding The Reinstatement Of
Ms. Meyer’s Probation
1.

Introduction

The State asserts that Ms. Meyer’s appeal is made moot and should be dismissed based
on the fact that the district court reinstated Ms. Meyer’s probation.

(Resp. Br., pp.7-8.)

However, even if this Court’s favorable decision would not produce any direct relief for
Ms. Meyer, her claim is still justiciable because the persisting record of a willful violation of
probation, and of the revocation of her probation status, will continue to present practical and
legal consequences in this case, and have negative ramifications for her future.
Justiciability issues, such as mootness, are freely reviewed. State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho
6, 8 (2010). Even where a question is moot, there are three exceptions to the mootness doctrine:
“(1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the person raising
the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review and thus is capable
of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of substantial public
interest.” As demonstrated below, the mootness doctrine does not apply to this case, because
Ms. Meyer’s appeal is justiciable under the “collateral legal consequences” exception.
2.

The Mootness Doctrine Does Not Apply Because The Finding Of A Probation
Violation And Order Revoking Probation Carry Possible Collateral Legal
Consequences

The mootness doctrine and its collateral consequences exception are addressed in
Storm v. Spaulding, 137 Idaho 145, 148 (Ct. App. 2002).

3

In Storm, a prison inmate (Storm),

filed a habeas corpus petition claiming his rights were violated at a disciplinary hearing that
resulted in a guilty finding on the charged offense; he was sanctioned by being reclassified from
medium custody to close custody, and was then removed to a maximum-security facility. Id., at
147. Storm alleged the reclassification was unlawful, and that the record of the disciplinary
offense would adversely affect his opportunity for release on parole. Id. As relief, Storm asked
that his record be purged of the DOR (disciplinary offense report), and that he be restored to
medium custody. Id. While the claim was pending, Storm was reclassified back to medium
custody. Id. The trial court dismissed the claim concluding, in part, that it was moot. Id.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals noted that Storm’s restoration to medium custody
classification had rendered his petition moot with respect to any claim for relief from the
disciplinary sanctions. Id., at 148. However, the Court agreed with Storm that his claim was not
moot due to the “possibility of collateral consequences,” specifically, “the possibility that the
disciplinary action will have a negative effect on the parole commission’s view of his suitability
for parole.” Id. The Court also noted that, even though the parole board had previously ordered
Storm be “passed to his full term release date,” Storm’s claim was still not moot given the
“possibility of further parole hearings or commutation hearings at the request of the inmate.” Id.,
at 149.
As in Storm, there is a possibility of collateral consequences from the violation that
Ms. Meyer challenges in this case. While her appeal may be moot as to relief from the sanctions
of the invalid finding of probation violation – i.e., the loss of her probation status – the district
court’s invalid finding of a willful violation, and its invalid order revoking her probation status,
are events with possible collateral legal consequences. The record of these events will have
several potential negative effects.

Specifically, the record of her violation may negatively

4

impact: (a) her eligibility for relief under I.C. § 19-2604; (b) penalties against her in this case if
she is again found in violation; and (c) her criminal history record information as utilized by
other decision-makers.
a.

Possible Negative Impact On Eligibility For Relief Under I.C. § 19-2604

The State argues “that no collateral consequences exist for Meyer because she is not
eligible for relief under [I.C. § 19-2604] regardless of the outcome of her appeal.”
(Resp. Br., p.6.) The State points to the district court’s recent order revoking Ms. Meyer’s
probation, after it found her again in violation of her probation. (Resp. Br., p.6.) The State
argues that, because Ms. Meyer has not timely filed a direct appeal from that order, “she is
permanently ineligible to seek relief under Idaho Code § 19-2604.” (Resp. Br., p.6.)

The

State’s argument is incorrect.
Although Ms. Meyer’s direct appeal rights may have expired,1 her post-conviction rights
have not. See I.C. § 19-4902(a) (providing a period of one-year from the expiration of the time
for appeal.) Because her post-conviction rights have not yet run, Ms. Meyer may yet seek to set
aside the district court’s recent adverse actions regarding her probation.

Ms. Meyer

acknowledges that, if the district court’s recent actions are not set aside, she will not be eligible
to have her underlying conviction set aside under subsections (1) and (2) of the statute.
However, even if those actions are not set aside, Ms. Meyer may still seek and obtain relief under
subsection (3) of the statute.
Subsection (3) of I.C. § 19-2604 grants the trial court discretion to reduce a felony to a
misdemeanor if the court finds there is “good cause” for granting the reduction. See I.C. § 19-

1

The district court’s order revoking probation for those violations was filed in October of 2017.
(Aug. R., pp.10-15.)
5

2604(3)(a), (b), (c), and (d)(iii).2 Relief under this subsection (3) is not barred by a record that
includes multiple probation violations and revocations. See I.C.§ 19-2604(3). However,
such a record carries “the possibility of a negative effect” on the court’s consideration of
whether there is “good cause” for granting the requested relief. See, e.g., Storm v. Spaulding,
137 Idaho at 148. Given that a subsequent criminal charge, or a subsequent conviction, would
bar the court from granting a defendant’s request for relief, see I.C.§ 19-2604(3)(c)(i), (ii), it
stands to reason that subsequent probation violations will be taken into account by the court
when it determines whether “good cause” exists to grant the requested reduction.
b.

2

Possible Penalties In This Case If Ms. Meyer Is Again Found In Violation
Of Her Probation

Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) provides:
(a) In addition to the circumstances in which relief from a felony conviction may be
granted under subsections (1) and (2) of this section, a defendant who has been
convicted of a felony and who has been discharged from probation may apply to the
sentencing court for a reduction of the conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor as
provided in this subsection.
(b) If less than five (5) years have elapsed since the defendant’s discharge from
probation, the application may be granted only if the prosecuting attorney stipulates
to the reduction.
(c) The decision as to whether to grant such an application shall be in the discretion of
the district court, provided that the application may be granted only if the court finds
that:
(i) The defendant has not been convicted of any felony committed after the
conviction from which relief is sought;
(ii) The defendant is not currently charged with any crime;
(iii) There is good cause for granting the reduction in sentence; and
(iv) In those cases where the stipulation of the prosecuting attorney is required under
paragraph (b) or (c) of this subsection, the prosecuting attorney has so stipulated.
…
(e) If the court grants the application, the court shall reduce the felony conviction to a
misdemeanor and amend the judgment of conviction for a term in the custody of the
state board of correction to “confinement in a penal facility” for the number of days
served prior to the judgment of conviction.

6

The validity of the probation violation and revocation order being challenged on appeal
have a possible negative impact in this case.

Although it initially reinstated Ms. Meyer’s

probation, the district court warned her that if she violated her probation again, “you will be in
front of me and we’ll have to consider some other options.” (3/29/17 Tr., p.28, Ls.11-13.)
Thus, the district court’s approach to dealing with probation violations is progressive, and the
adverse effect of any probation violation will be cumulative. As noted by the State in its
Respondent’s Brief, Ms. Meyer (Resp. Br., p.8), after the district court revoked and reinstated
Ms. Meyer’s probation based on probation violation at issue here, Ms. Meyer admitted violating
probation again, and the district court for a second time reinstated her probation. See Aug. R.,
pp.12-15.) On March 28, 2018, Ms. Meyer was again found in violation of her probation, and
this time – which would be her “third strike” on probation – the district court decided to revoke
probation, and instead of reinstating it, to order retained jurisdiction; Ms. Meyer presently is in
custody. (See Order of Revocation of Probation, Imposition of Sentence and Order Retaining
Jurisdiction, filed 4/3/2018)).3

Ms. Meyer has already arguably suffered the negative

consequence of a third – rather than second – strike due to the invalid violation. However, there
also remains the possibility that, when Ms. Meyer next comes before the district court, the record
of the invalid probation violation at issue in this case will have a negative effect on the district
court’s view of Ms. Meyer’s rehabilitation potential, leading the court to decline to extend
probation to her again. See e.g., State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 557 (1998) (affirming trial court’s
decision to revoke probation based, in part, on record of defendant’s repeated probation
violations).

3

This Order is the subjection of Appellant’s Motion To Augment The Record, filed
contemporaneously with this Reply Brief.
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c.

Negative Impact To Criminal History Record Information Utilized By
Other Decision-Makers

The invalid probation violation and order revoking probation affixes a permanent blemish
to Ms. Meyer’s record.

Like the legal fact of a criminal conviction, which “is a collateral

consequence sufficient to overcome the mootness issue … [e]ven though the defendant has been
released from custody,” State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227 (2004) (emphasis added), an order
revoking probation for a probation violation is, itself, a collateral consequence sufficient to
overcome the State’s mootness challenge in this case. Accord, Hann v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th
Cir. 1970) (holding that the fact of a probation revocation is collateral consequence sufficient to
withstand mootness challenge), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971). Probation violations and
revocations are among the dispositions reported to and maintained in the Idaho Criminal History
Repository, and this information is made easily available to the inquiring public.
http://sentencing.isc.idaho.gov/ (last visited 4/10/18).

This information is relied upon by

criminal justice agencies, certain employment agencies, and regulatory and licensing agencies.
See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Use and Management of Criminal History Information: A
Comprehensive Report, 2001 Update, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/umchri01.pdf (last
visited 4/10/18).
Additionally, the Idaho Bureau of Criminal Identification and the Idaho State Police
collect and maintain this dispositional data as part of its Criminal History Record Information
(“CHRI”).

I.C. §§ 67-3001(4), 67-3005.

Consequently, if Ms. Meyer encounters future

difficulties with the law in Idaho or any other jurisdiction, law enforcement agencies and courts
are likely to consider previous criminal history record information, which will include a record
of the invalid probation violation and invalid revocation order.

8

The invalid probation violation and revocation will also be included in any updates to
Ms. Meyer’s presentence investigation report and made part of the information relied upon by
any future sentencing court. See I.C.R. 32(b); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567
(Ct. App. 1982).

The PSI’s information is in turn relied upon by correctional institutions,

probation and parole departments, and court-appointed psychiatrists, see I.C.R. 32(h)(3), whose
assessments may impact Ms. Meyer. Also, a record of a probation revocation carries measurable
consequences in any federal criminal case; such a record, and the extent of it, may subject
Ms. Meyer to increased penalties should she face federal criminal charges in the future. See
USSG 4A1.2(k) (2014) (assigning “points” for probation revocation in the calculation of
defendant’s “criminal history category” and corresponding sentencing range).
In other words, there remains a very real and practical effect to an appellate ruling in
Ms. Meyer’s case, even though she does not seek reinstatement of her probation. Ms. Meyer
submits that the potential collateral consequences, as detailed above, are sufficient to overcome
mootness in her case.

3.

Even If This Court Determines Ms. Meyer’s Case Is Moot, This Court Should
Still Answer The Question Presented In This Case

Whether or not this Court determines that the collateral consequences of the probation
violation and revocation order are sufficient to overcome mootness, this Court should review this
case under its plenary appellate jurisdiction granted by Article 5, section 9, of the Idaho
Constitution.

See Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797, 801–02 (1977) (citing State v. Lewis, 96

Idaho 743 (1975)); see also State v. Glenn, 156 Idaho 22, 25, 319 P.3d 1191, 1194 (2014) (this
Court will review appeals within our plenary jurisdiction that do not fully meet the criteria in the
appellate rules, particularly when a case presents an important issue that will “provide helpful
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guidance to the affected legal community.”). In Lewis this Court “exercised this authority to
clarify important points in the construction of the kidnapping and rape statutes and to prevent
further errors of the kind which led to criminal charges being improperly dismissed in that case.”
Stockwell, 98 Idaho at 802. Ms. Meyer’s case presents a similarly important question concerning
the due process hearing rights to which a probationer is entitled. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); see also State v. Garner, 161
Idaho 708 (2017); State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762 (2007). Furthermore, questions surrounding the
State’s evidentiary burden of proving facts that warrant revocation are of a recurring nature. See,
e.g., State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762 (2007); State v. Clausen, 163 Idaho 180 (Ct. App. 2017).
Idaho’s trial courts have been instructed that the State must provide “satisfactory proof” of a
violation. See I.C. 19-2602; State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 711 (2017). However, this Court
has not articulated the degree of proof that will satisfy the court. See State v. Roy, 113 Idaho
388, 390 (Ct. App. 1987) (where parties stipulated to a preponderance of the evidence standard,
the appellate court need not decide whether different standard applied).
The resolution of this issue will be of practical importance in administering the criminal
justice system in this state and will prevent future errors by trial courts. Accordingly, whether or
not this Court’s concludes that Ms. Meyer’s case is moot, this Court still should choose to review
the decision of the district court pursuant to its plenary power of appellate review under Article
5, section 9.
B.

The District Court’s Decision To Revoke Ms. Meyer’s Probation Is Properly Before This
Court For Review; Fundamental Error Need Not Be Demonstrated
Contrary to the State’s argument (Resp. Br., p.8), the district court’s decision to revoke

probation is reviewed for abuse of discretion; Ms. Meyer is not required to demonstrate
fundamental error. As recently explained by the Idaho Court of Appeals,
10

The fundamental error analysis articulated in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245
P.3d 961 (2010) did not replace the abuse of discretion standard applicable to
claims that a district court erred in revoking probation. If the Perry opinion
intended to replace the abuse of discretion standard with a fundamental error
standard, almost every direct appeal from an underlying criminal case would be
reviewed for fundamental error, as criminal procedural rules stem from
constitutional provisions. We do not read Perry that broadly.
State v. Clausen, 163 Idaho 180, __, 408 P.3d 935, 937-38.
The Court confirmed that the two-step abuse of discretion standard of review, which is
set forth in Appellant’s Brief at page 8, is the applicable standard of review in this case. See id.
Moreover, this Court has not previously required that a defendant contemporaneously
object to the district court’s finding of a probation violation in order to preserve his or her ability
to challenge that finding on appeal. The purpose of the due process hearing is to determine
whether the probationer actually violated the conditions of probation as the State has alleged;
like an appeal that challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury verdict, or an appeal
that challenges the appropriateness of a sentence, no further objection or request is necessary to
appeal the finding that the probation violation was proved. See State v. Clontz, 156 Idaho 787,
331 P.3d 529 (Ct. App. 2014) (observing that “the defendant has not been required to object
upon entry of the jury’s verdict to the insufficiency of the evidence in order to appeal that issue.
Likewise, the defendant has not been required to object to the sentence pronounced immediately
after its pronouncement in order to challenge on appeal the appropriateness of the sentence”).
As set forth in Appellant’s Brief and this Reply Brief, Ms. Meyer has established that the
district court acted inconsistently with applicable legal standards, and the State has failed to
show that the error was harmless.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Applying An Impermissibly Low
Evidentiary Standard – Merely “Substantial Competent Evidence” – To Find Ms. Meyer
Willfully Violated Her Probation

11

Contrary to the State’s argument (Resp. Br., pp.12-13), the “substantial competent
evidence” standard of proof applied by the district court does not comply with constitutional
requirements.

A “substantial competent evidence” standard requires no more than the

production of competent evidence in the trial court; it describes nothing about the level or degree
of proof that is required to establish the violation “to the satisfaction of the court.”
The State has cited to federal cases dealing with federal probation revocation
proceedings, and describing the federal “reasonably satisfied” standard as the standard of proof
required. (Resp. Br., pp.14-17.) However, that was not the standard described or applied by the
district court in this case. The district court stated that “[t]he Court merely needs to determine if
there is substantial evidence to show that the defendant failed to stay on her prescribed
medications” (3/20/17 Tr., p.57, Ls.20-22), and then concluded the State’s met that burden by
merely producing substantial evidence:
Therefore, the Court finds that the defendant – the State has produced substantial
evidence that this defendant has violated condition one of failing to take your
medications as prescribed and ordered by this Court.
(3/20/17 Tr., p.58, Ls.10-14.) (Emphasis added.)
The district court did not find that it was satisfied or persuaded by the State’s evidence
that Ms. Meyer had actually violated her probation.4
As argued in Appellant’s Brief, the mere production of “substantial competent evidence”
is incompatible with the function of a probation violation revocation hearing, which “must lead
to final evaluation of any contested relevant facts and consideration of whether the facts as
determined warrant revocation.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972). “Substantial

4

Nor did the district court make any finding, at the probation violation hearing, that Ms. Meyer
willfully violated the condition of her probation. (See generally 3/20/17 Tr.) The district court’s
12

competent evidence” is wholly inadequate as the level of proof needed for the court to say it is
persuaded that the violation actually did occur. The latter – proof that the alleged violation
actually did occur – is required before a court is permitted to deprive a probation of her liberty.
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484.
D.

The State Has Failed To Carry Its Burden Of Showing The District Court’s Error Was
Harmless
The State has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that the district court’s erroneous

lowering of the State’s burden of proof was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Contrary to the
State’s assertion (Resp. Br., p.18), the evidence does not show Ms. Meyer admitted she “stopped
taking her prescription medication”; rather, the evidence was that Ms. Meyer was not taking
prescription medications. (3/20/17 Tr., p.40, Ls.22-23.) Ms. Meyer’s subsequent remarks at the
disposition hearing, which explained and did not contradict the State’s evidence, was that she
was never told she had to be on prescription medications, but that taking prescription medication
was something her counselor had “suggested”; she explained, “I had been on antidepressants in
the past,” and taking medication “was something I had considered”; but she insisted her
counselor “had never said that I needed to be on prescribed medications.” (3/29/17 Tr., p.16,
Ls.21-23, p.18, Ls.3-4.)
Nevertheless, the district court revoked Ms. Meyer’s probation based on its finding that
Ms. Meyer violated the condition of probation number (2); that condition provides:
Defendant is to take all medication prescribed at the rate it is prescribed and shall
waive privilege with all medical and mental health care provides as to her
probation officer.
(3/29/17 Tr., p.19, Ls.6-9; R., pp.45, 72.) (Emphasis added.)

finding that the violation had been “willful” was articulated for the first time at the disposition
hearing. (3/29/17 Tr., p.4, Ls.14-16.)
13

The State’s evidence was Ms. Meyer’s probation officer “believed” she was prescribed a
medication for bipolarism (3/20/17), and that her father was “aware” that at some point – he
testified he did not know when – she had been prescribed an antidepressant. (3/20/17 Tr., p.33,
Ls.13-22.). The State did not, however, present evidence of a physician’s order or pharmacy fill
for prescribed medication. (See generally 3/20/17 Tr.) The State’s evidence is also lacking as to
the prescribed “rate” for the mediation, i.e., whether the medication was to be taken on a specific
dosage schedule, or “as needed” (“PRN”).5 (See generally 3/20/17 Tr., p.37, Ls.16 – p.50, L.21.)
Moreover, and contrary to the State’s position (Resp. Br., p.21), Ms. Meyer is not
precluded from arguing the weaknesses of the evidence that the State presented in her case.
Contrary to the State’s assertion (Resp. Br., p.20), Ms. Meyer never “agreed” to only contest the
issue of her mental capacity; she denied willfully violating her probation, and the State bore the
burden to prove that she had. This Court’s decision in State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271
(2017), does not apply to shift the State’s burden on to Ms. Meyer to allege, present and argue
theories that disprove the elements of the State’s case.
Given the slim and flawed evidence in the district court, the State cannot meet its burden
of showing the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; but for the impermissibly-low
burden of proof, there is a reasonable possibility that the district court would not have found that

5

Prescription medications, particularly psychotropic medications, are sometimes taken “as
needed” or “PRN” (“pro re nata”), and sometimes a regular dosing schedule is prescribed. See
“PRN (AS-Needed) Psychotropic Medication Use in Borderline Patients and Other Personality–
Disordered Subjects,” (2015), U.S National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4077949/ (page last visited 4/5/2018). “The
results of this study indicate that PRN [taken-as-needed] psychotropic medication is widely used
for the treatment of borderline patients, particularly those who have not achieved a recovery in
both the symptomatic and psychosocial realms.”)
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Ms. Meyer violated the condition of her probation had it applied a constitutionally permissible
standard of proof.6
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and for those stated in her Appellant’s Brief, Ms. Meyer
respectfully asks this Court to vacate the district court’s finding that she violated her probation,
vacate the order revoking her probation, and remand her case to the district court for further
proceedings.

__________/s/_______________
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

6

The State has augmented the appellate record with a copy of Ms. Meyer’s signed probation
agreement, apparently as post-trial evidence of her knowledge of the probation conditions.
(Aug. R., p.7.) (Resp. Br., p.20.) However, that document is irrelevant to this Court’s review of
the evidence in this case. It is clear from this record – and the State has not asserted otherwise –
that this document, which was signed after the district court’s file-stamp date, and which was
added to the repository records at some undisclosed time, was not presented to or considered by
the district court in Ms. Meyer’s probation violation revocation proceedings. (See generally
3/20/17 Tr. & 3/29/17 Tr.) It is clear from the transcript that, when the district court attempted to
locate the signed document, it could not; instead, the district court directed Ms. Meyer’s trial
counsel to locate and provide her with a copy of the document she presumably would have
signed. (See 3/29/17 Tr., p.17, Ls.18-20, p.18, Ls.21-13, p.22, Ls.15-19.) Thus, while the
retrieval of the signed document might have significance in a future probation violation hearing
following remand, it is irrelevant to this Court’s review of the record and its evaluation of issues
in this appeal. See Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 936 (Ct. App. 2005) (“Unless introduced
into evidence, pleadings [including sworn affidavits attached thereto] are not evidence”);
Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050, 1054 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]tatements in motions are not evidence
and are therefore not entitled to evidentiary weight.”).
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